COMMANDERS DIGEST

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MAY 15 1968

RECEIVED DOCUMENTS DIVISION

BACK IN BUSINESS—The attack carrier USS Forrestal sails from Hampton Roads, Va., for the first time in almost seven months. Forrestal has been in the Norfolk Naval Shipyard for repairs since she sustained considerable damage from a fire in July 1967, while on combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. The $15 million overhaul replaced 175 feet of the after flight deck, as well as shops and compartments below.

Defense Dept. Expands Police Recruiting Drive

The Defense Department has expanded its Civilian Police Recruiting Program to include informal recruitment of military personnel on-base during off-duty hours by any authorized law enforcement agency.

Under the revised DOD policy, police departments adjacent to a military installation or "serving an area which has a traditional relationship" with a particular service are now authorized to conduct on-base, off-duty recruiting.

Previously, on-base recruitment was confined to police departments from major metropolitan areas and was conducted under military supervision during on-duty hours. Smaller law enforcement agencies were allowed to conduct indirect off-base, off-duty recruiting.

As the program progressed, however, it was discovered the smaller police departments were not receiving maximum benefit from the program under the off-base, off-duty restrictions.

In an effort to further enhance the program's effectiveness, and "provide a larger number of police agencies the privilege of on-base contact with potential applicants," DOD revised its policy to include the new on-base, off-duty provision.

Defense officials said the primary difference between the on-base, on-duty and on-base, off-duty recruiting effort is that the "off-duty is informal and the initiative for the first contact remains with the individual serviceman" and must take place during off-duty hours.

There is one restriction under the

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Secretary Clifford Says U.S. Has Contained Aggression in RVN

The United States has succeeded in its policy of containing Communist aggression in South Vietnam and now hopes for a peaceful solution to the conflict there, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford said April 22.

Speaking before an Associated Press meeting in New York, Mr. Clifford stated that "the attempt of the North to take over the South by force of arms has been prevented. The South Vietnamese have acquired the capacity to begin to ensure their own security through their own efforts. We will continue to help the South exploit these successes, even as we strive for peace through other means."

Mr. Clifford said these were the conclusions drawn from a comprehensive review of policy and programs in Vietnam ordered by President Johnson in March.

"We concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more, but rather that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and its fighting forces will now permit us to level off our effort—and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction.

"The review established to our satisfaction that Southeast Asia is not for us a 'bottomless pit.'"

Mr. Clifford said the review further confirmed U.S. judgment, "already reached by President Thieu," that the South Vietnamese are ready to take on more of the responsibility and carry more of the military burden in the conflict with North Vietnam.

Pointing to a recent decision to

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Sec. Resor Discusses Army Manpower Management

Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor told the City Club of Portland, Oregon, April 19, "perhaps our greatest challenge" is managing the large wartime expansion of manpower while deploying substantial forces to Vietnam and maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces in Europe, Korea and at home.

He noted that in building up forces to meet Vietnam requirements, the active Army since 1965 has increased in size by about 50 percent to a strength of 1⅓ million.

Fifteen of the Army's 19⅔ combat divisions are deployed overseas—eight in Vietnam, five in Europe and two in Korea.

Forces in Europe

Since 1951 the Army has maintained in Europe five NATO-committed combat divisions, as well as a separate infantry brigade in Berlin.

Secretary Resor said, "These forces, along with those of our NATO allies, provide a credible conventional warfare option to deal with those situations for which strategic nuclear weapons are not a credible deterrent. They are necessary because our prospective enemies might otherwise feel free to engage in military activities below the minimum level of gravity at which they feel we might resort to a nuclear response."

Two Divisions in Korea

As for Korea, two U.S. Army divisions have been there since the period immediately following the cease-fire in 1953.

Mr. Resor pointed out, "To counter recently increased North Korean hostile actions, we have raised the priority of these forces for personnel and sent to Congress a request for a special $100 million add-on to the Military Assistance Program for Korea."

The secretary noted that in addition to the Army forces deployed overseas, "we maintain five active Army divisions in the United States as a strategic reserve to meet contingencies which could arise throughout the world and which could involve U.S. commitments and interests.

Stanley R. Resor

"This level of forces will be maintained, even with the additional Vietnam deployments recently announced, since the reserve forces designated for call to active duty next month will provide some units for Vietnam and others to replace the active Army units deployed there."

Secretary Resor said in addition to forces in the active Army, central reserve forces are supplemented by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units.

"It is essential that the number and types of units in the Reserve Components complement the organization of the active Army, and together with the active Army constitute a balanced force structure," he added.

Manpower Challenge

Concerning the manpower management challenge, Secretary Resor told of the "short-tour" areas of Southeast Asia and Korea. He said, "Despite the number of men in these areas, we have been able for the most part to maintain a policy limiting tours there to one year, and to give career Army personnel a minimum of two years between assignments to these short-tour areas. This short-tour policy in Vietnam and Korea results in over 400,000 soldiers being assigned to and returning from those areas each year."

Regarding the turn-over of manpower, Secretary Resor said almost 40 percent of the Army consists of draftees on active duty for only two years, and another 30 percent are enlistees who do not reenlist. As a result, the Army currently loses about 42,000 men monthly through expiration of terms of service or other causes. To replace these losses, the Army operates training centers and schools which turn out 42,000 officers and enlisted men monthly.

As for 1968, the secretary noted that the Army plans to receive 485,000 new untrained enlisted personnel and 44,000 new officers, while returning to civilian life an almost equal number of trained men.

Secretary Resor said this high flow of men through the Army, although creating problems of turbulence, at the same time significantly strengthens the strategic posture, "Because it greatly increases our potential capability to respond to contingencies."

The secretary said in addition there are more than 500,000 trained personnel in the Army's Immediate Ready Reserve who within the last three years have completed at least two years of active duty. This is in addition to reservists in units. More than 25 percent of these have had combat experience in Vietnam.

Secretary Resor explained that with these resources, should a contingency requiring full mobilization occur, manpower and training requirements could be met in a relatively short period.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Advisory Committee On Women in Service Holds Planning Session

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service (DACOWITS) met in Washington, D.C., April 21-25 to formulate plans for future educational and informational projects designed to promote public acceptance of the military as a career for women.

Defense officials said the problem of public acceptance of women in the military service is a continuing one which requires constant attention. Although the problem is not as great today as it once was, DOD officials added, there is still the need to educate the public in the need for and role of women in the armed forces.

During the committee's semi-annual meeting, it also submitted to the Defense Department recommendations to "ensure effective utilization of the capabilities of women in the armed forces and standards relating to their general welfare."

The committee was briefed at the Pentagon by DOD officials and by the directors of the women's military components on subjects "of prime interest to the committee and women in the services."

Composed of 50 prominent civic and professional women from throughout the United States, DACOWITS members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense to three-year terms to advise DOD on policies and standards affecting women in the military.

DOD Clarifies Pro-Pay Rules For Reserves Called to Duty

Qualified reserve specialists ordered to active duty for other than training purposes may receive proficiency pay under recent changes to the Defense Department's Proficiency Pay Program.

Department of Defense officials said clarification of eligibility provisions within DOD Directive 1340.2, intended to cover the mobilization of reservists, were not specific enough in their intent and that many qualified reserve personnel might not have received "pro pay" unless these stipulations were reworded.

GENERAL COUNSEL — John M. Steadman has been selected for appointment as the General Counsel of the Air Force, succeeding J. William Doolittle, confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Mr. Steadman is now Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The necessity for clarification of eligibility provisions in the five-year-old directive was discovered after President Johnson ordered some 14,600 reservists to active duty in late January.

Under the changes, reserve personnel may qualify for "pro pay" if they meet the following qualifications:

- Are serving on active duty, other than active duty for training, and are entitled to basic pay;
- Are designated by the military department as fully qualified in a military specialty approved by the department for proficiency pay in the grade and skill level in which they are serving;
- Are serving in pay grade E-3 or higher and, except for reserve members called to active duty who have completed their service obligation, have completed at least 24 months of active service which, if it includes any period of active duty for training, shall be consecutive service;
- Have a minimum of six months of continuous active service immediately before the award of proficiency pay, except that in cases of reservists ordered to active duty this requirement may be waived if it is determined that such personnel, after entering active service, meet established qualification standards for the specialty to which they are assigned, and
- Meet any other conditions of eligibility prescribed by the Secretary of the Military Department under which they are assigned.

Major fields covered under the proficiency pay program include electronics, communications, intelligence, missilemen, automated data processing, nuclear power, weather, and radar specialties.

Civilian Police Recruiting Expanded

(Continued from Page 1)

new provision. Recruiting priority remains with the major law enforcement agency. No off-duty, on-base recruiting will be permitted at an installation while an on-base, on-duty team recruiting is at the same installation.

Defense officials said that police departments wishing to participate in the recruitment program under the new provision are authorized to request direct support from installation commanders in their geographical area. Base commanders have been ordered to provide all possible assistance, including space for off-duty interviews and administrative support such as testing of the candidate and reasonable availability of the man for follow up interviews.

Military personnel who are within 90 days of their release date and have received a firm offer of employment by an authorized police agency are eligible for early release under the Civilian Police Recruiting Program, and will be released no later than 10 days before the effective date of employment.

THE COMMUNIST THRUST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

Nowhere have the Communists taken the offensive more openly than in Southeast Asia. There is, quite literally, not one nation in this part of the world that has not had to contend with a Communist threat to its plans for peaceful development.

Mindful of the rebuff the free world dealt the North Korean attempt at direct aggression in 1950, Communists in Southeast Asia are trying a newer and more sophisticated form of aggression. They call it the "War of National Liberation." It is a formidable weapon, as we have reason to know.

The nations of Southeast Asia are still weak, militarily and economically. Left to their own resources, it is unlikely that even the most determined of them would be able to resist the combination of external pressure and subversion from within. Should this Communist strategy succeed, a Communist-dominated Southeast Asia would result.

Threat of Oppression

I am not raising the spectre of "monolithic" communism. . . . But Communist oligopoly is not necessarily an improvement over Communist monopoly, from our point of view.

We know that Hanoi is not a satellite of Peking. But, would Hanoi's rule in Laos or Cambodia be any less oppressive, or any more welcome, to the local populations than Peking's rule in Burma or Malaysia? The danger posed by the resulting alliance of Peking and Hanoi, and other states made into their images, would be at least as dangerous to us, to India, to Indonesia, and to other countries as any single "monolithic" power dominating the same area. It might be even more aggressive, as each sought to demonstrate his superior zeal.

If this happened we would be confronted, in our "small world" of supersonic jet aircraft and missiles, with the threat of a hostile Asia quite similar to the threat which we perceived 30 years ago as a serious menace to our own security.

"World Policeman"

Another straw man some people like to set up for themselves to attack is the image of America as a "world policeman," determined to intervene willy-nilly everywhere and anywhere in the world where there is even the hint of a Communist threat. Nothing could be farther from the truth. We realize that, in the last analysis, only the Asians themselves can prevent a Communist Asia.

Today, despite the evident imbalance of power between them and mainland China and its allies, peoples and governments are resisting Communism successfully now in Thailand, in Indonesia, in Malaysia, and elsewhere. They will continue to do so, provided we and our Allies prevail in Vietnam, and they remain confident that they are not alone in facing up to Hanoi and Peking.

Asian Self-Help

To enhance their efforts at economic development, and in defense, the nations of Southeast Asia have formed a number of useful regional organizations. But, both militarily and economically, even their combined power does not right the balance.

What does right it, what does give them the confidence to pursue their own efforts, is America's demonstrated willingness to support Asian governments who are making their own self-development, and self-defense efforts in the face of Communist insurgency.

Formally . . . this willingness was expressed in the SEATO treaty, signed in 1954, a treaty which specifically recognizes the possibility of the new form of aggression which now confronts our Asian friends and Allies.

Credibility of U.S. Support

Far from making us a world policeman, it is this willingness to assist, provided it remains credible, which is in fact the best guarantee that we and the Asians have that no new world war, no new critical situations requiring a military intervention will ever be reached.

As long as they remain convinced of American willingness to stand behind them and help them, the small nations of Asia can continue to face up to Hanoi and Peking, deal with Communist insurgency at home, and develop in the ways of their own choosing.

This is what is at stake in Vietnam—the credibility of America's support in Southeast Asia, and indeed, in the many other areas in whose security we have a national interest. Remove this credibility and we will indeed be placed in the position of becoming world policemen, or captives in a fortress America. In theory, there may be better places to fight than in Vietnam; in fact, we have no alternative.

The Enemy: Communist Aggression

First of all, what is our enemy in Vietnam? Our enemy in Vietnam is aggression, conducted by the Communist government of North Vietnam, and supported by other

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** Excerpts from a recent address by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow.*

Communist governments. We do not maintain that this Communist government in Hanoi is a satellite of Peking—but neither do we accept the notion that it is a great bulwark against it. The two are allies—desiring the same goals, using the same means. When we resist one ally in South Vietnam, the lesson is not lost on the other, in Peking.

Ho Chi Minh's Record

Aggression in South Vietnam is directed and supplied by, and increasingly manned by personnel of the government of Hanoi headed by Ho Chi Minh. That Ho Chi Minh is a Vietnamese nationalist, no one will deny. But what some people would like us to forget is that he is also a Communist. As a Communist, he has made himself the enemy of every kind of Vietnamese nationalism not his own.

By 1951, he had driven the last of the nationalists non-Communists out of the Viet Minh. In 1955 and 1956, he drove some 840,000 non-Communist Vietnamese out of North Vietnam, imprisoned about 100,000 others, and liquidated outright at least another 50,000.

Not content to have eliminated any contending schools of thought from his own domain, he set about deliberately to impose his own system on . . . South Vietnam as well. He planned to do this not through political agitation, or through anything resembling the democratic process—but by force.

His plans were made early. After the cease-fire of 1954, he instructed some of his followers to go underground, in the South. Others, he called to the North for training, and re-infiltration. By 1957, he had turned these forces loose, beginning a campaign of political and military action, and outright terror, which has gradually grown in size to the proporttions it has reached today.

Exploitation and Terror

To be sure, this campaign operated on fertile ground. In any country with such a history of chaos as Vietnam in the 20th century, there are bound to be many disaffected people, and much difficulty in establishing a central government based on consent. The Communists have recognized this from the beginning, and are skillful in linking their political efforts to the exploitation of popular grievances.

Because of these grievances, and through the use of terror—against individuals, groups, and recently, against entire cities—the Communists have succeeded in building an infrastructure with roots buried in the soil of South Vietnam. As long as this infrastructure remains, the war in Vietnam will not be won. When it is destroyed, victory in Vietnam will be as assured as the victory over the guerrillas in Malaysia, some 10 years in the past. This is the key to understanding the war in Vietnam, a war which is, despite the battles, and their casualties, primarily a political one.

Target: The Cities

The events of the . . . so-called Tet, or New Year's offensive, reveal to us how important this basic fact is. During the Tet offensive, the Communists attacked some 38 of 44 of Vietnam's provincial capitals, plus the capital city of Saigon itself. They did this at the cost of tremendous losses to their own forces—estimated to be as high as 38,000 men killed alone—not to mention over 6,000 prisoners and uncounted wounded.

Their purpose in these attacks was not a purely military one. Nor would they sacrifice so many men merely to create a "diversion," as some commentators have suggested, from the more purely military confrontation at Khe Sanh. Their primary purpose, rather, was to weaken, or even to destroy the Government of South Vietnam. For the Communists know, and we must never forget, that if they ever did succeed in destroying the constitutional, elected political authority in South Vietnam, they would indeed have won the war. They would have won it even if a Khe Sanh, Dak To, a Loc Ninh, or any other point in geography, and dozens other to boot, were successfully defended.

Effect of the Attacks

They did not succeed in their maximum goals. The popular uprisings which they told their troops would greet them in the cities never materialized. Indeed, the urban population of Vietnam has clearly demonstrated it is not willing to throw in its lot with the Viet Cong. This was a failure, and hopefully, a revealing failure to the Vietnamese Communists. But we cannot say whether or not it was a decisive failure.

Were the Vietnamese Government now to stand by, inactively, in the face of the recent destruction, in the face of people made homeless, in the face of the fear that the Viet Cong have brought, for the first time, to the peoples of the cities, then the Communists would consider their losses to have been in vain. This would be no less true if the Vietnamese Government were to abdicate its responsibilities, either for civic action, or for the maintenance of security, to us Americans.

For in that case, it would only be a matter of time before the cycle would repeat itself again, and again. And sooner or later, losses and overwhelming "kill ratios" notwithstanding, the people's patience with a government that can neither help them nor protect them would crumble, and the Communists would have won their political war.

I say this not to be dramatic, but to point out to you that the U.S. Government has never lost sight of the fact that as much as this is a political war, it is a South Vietnamese war. And the South Vietnamese alone can win it. Although the final analysis—the definitive report—has yet to be made, the reactions of the South Vietnamese so far give a strong indication that they are determined to do just that.

LBJ Seeks 'Reasonable' Site for Vietnam Talks

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford returned April 20 from a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at the Hague. In a planeside interview at Andrews AFB, Md., the Secretary answered the following questions from the press:

Question: Mr. Secretary, what did you accomplish on this trip?

Secretary Clifford: First, from a personal standpoint, I found it an exceedingly valuable trip. I had not known before the importance and significance of this particular group within NATO—the Nuclear Planning Group. It operates on the basis of a full and free exchange of information between the seven member nations of the Nuclear Planning Group. We took up almost every phase of the nuclear defense of the NATO countries. That included the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the use of ADMs—as you know, those are the atomic demolition munitions. Also we had a lengthy discussion about the possible use of ABMs—the anti-ballistic weapons—and one session was devoted to the subject of general nuclear planning. I found the exchange between the members to be exceedingly free and full, and I think it was very valuable looking toward the increasing defense of the NATO countries against any possible future aggression.

Question: Mr. Secretary, President Johnson has said that this country would go anywhere, any time, to talk peace. Yet they are still quibbling over the selection of a site. How do you reconcile these statements?

Secretary Clifford: When that expression was used, and when it has been used since, I interpreted it along with the rule of reason. What he meant obviously was that he would go any reasonable place at any reasonable time. For instance, when he made that statement originally, it did not enter my mind that he was thinking of going to Hanoi. I think that he obviously meant that he would go any reasonable place at any reasonable time. I believe what we are going through now is the kind of jockeying that you go through in this sort of negotiation. Many of you will remember the difficulties that we had in getting the Korean talks started 15 years ago. We are going through that type of difficulty now. I think they are attempting to extract as much propaganda value as they can from it. I believe ultimately they will decide that the time has come to agree on a place and I think the talks will go on.

Question: Sir, it has been almost three weeks since bombing was restricted to below the 20th Parallel. How long do you feel you can continue to wait for this stalling to end?

Secretary Clifford: Insofar as the restriction of the bombing is concerned, I believe that the job is being done. I think that the restriction to the 20th Parallel does not interfere perceptibly or seriously with our interdiction of the routes through the North Vietnamese Panhandle. So I would not anticipate that that constitutes any restriction on the time within which negotiations might ultimately be agreed upon.

Question: Isn't it true, sir, that the North Vietnamese are putting a greater effort into anti-aircraft activity in the Panhandle now?

Secretary Clifford: Yes, that appears to be what is taking place. When they learned that the bombing was being restricted north of the 20th Parallel, they apparently made the decision to move a certain portion of that equipment down south of the 20th, so there is greater anti-aircraft fire than there was formerly. The information that we have is that it is not seriously interfering with our efforts to interdict the lines of communication south of the 20th Parallel.

Question: Mr. Secretary, what countries do you think should participate in the preliminary talks?

Secretary Clifford: At this particular stage, I believe that only the United States and North Vietnam should participate. I believe that after the United States and North Vietnam have agreed upon a site for the talks, then consideration should be given to participants. That would be more a matter for the State Department to decide than for the Defense Department.

Question: Then why is there this difficulty about find a site if this is really a site to talk about talking and to select a future site? Why are we squabbling about where to go?

Secretary Clifford: One factor that I know enters into it is that we would like a place to be agreed upon ultimately where our allies would be permitted to go so that they would be available for consultation. Even though they might not take part in sessions, yet we would like to have them available and that is one of the points that is considered in the ultimate selection of the site.

Question: Sir, a forgotten question—the Pueblo and the 82 men who are held prisoner out there. Senator McCarthy has suggested ransoming these people. What is your feeling on that since that is a primary responsibility of yours?

Secretary Clifford: The negotiations for the release of the 82 men on the Pueblo have continued. It is our hope that ultimately their release will be effectuated. They were not violating the territorial waters of North Korea at the time they were apprehended. Their apprehension was an unlawful act under international law, and it is certainly my hope that the North Koreans at some time would release them. I have not heard of the suggestion that they be ransomed, and I would say only to you it would take an extraordinarily persuasive argument to convince me that that was the way we ought to proceed.

Question: Mr. Secretary, do you have new information on which to say now categorically that they were not violating the territorial waters of North Korea?

Secretary Clifford: We know that at the time they were apprehended—both from our own evidence and evidence elicited from the North Koreans—we know at that time they were not violating the territorial waters of North Korea.

South Vietnam

(Continued from Page 1)

equip South Vietnamese forces with modern U.S. weapons, Mr. Clifford said that while the South Vietnamese gain in military strength and the enemy continues to sustain losses, "we still hope . . . for a peaceful settlement instead of a military solution.

"A stable peace is the only true victory for Vietnam. As a result of the President's actions and at least a minimal response from Hanoi, there is some reason for hope. America has always held out its hand in peace, hoping our adversaries would grasp it. We continue to hold out our hand today and perhaps the fingertips of peace will soon touch."

However, he added, if the North Vietnamese government shows it would rather fight than talk, "or elects both to talk and fight, the record of success we have already achieved shows that military victory in South Vietnam is beyond Hanoi's reach."

Mr. Clifford said critics of U.S. policy in South Vietnam ask why America, with all its military might, cannot defeat North Vietnam. "They overlook the point that we are not attempting to conquer North Vietnam. We are not trying to destroy the government in the North. We just want the North Vietnamese to stop their aggression against the South."

NASA Establishes Office For Defense Projects Support

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has established a headquarters group to manage certain specialized tasks necessary in support of a limited number of Department of Defense projects.

The newly formed Defense Projects Support Office will provide a single focal point within NASA for DOD projects under the Special Programs Office of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology.

NASA officials said the new office will not replace the more general research and technology support traditionally provided to the military services.

Army Orders 480,000 M-16s For U.S., Vietnamese Personnel

PICK IT UP EASY—Air Force Sgt. Dennis M. Madigan stands ready to attach a fire suppression kit to an HH-43 Huskie used by Detachment 10, 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, in response to an aircraft emergency at Binh Thuy Air Base, Vietnam. The flying fire suppressionists are members of the 632nd Combat Support Group Fire Department.

An Army order for production of 480,000 more M-16 rifles is in line with recently announced Defense Department plans to equip both U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia and South Vietnamese forces with this standard infantry weapon, DOD officials said April 22.

Defense officials said the weapons produced under the two multi-year contracts awarded April 19 will go to strategic forces in the U.S., the Eighth Army in Korea and RVN forces in Vietnam.

Plans to step up the equipping of South Vietnamese forces with the M-16 were announced April 11 by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford. He stated at the time that arming RVN units with the M-16 and other modern U.S. weapons is a step toward the gradual take-over of a major portion of the war effort by the South Vietnamese (C.D. 4/20/68).

Speaking before an Associated Press luncheon in New York on April 22, Mr. Clifford said "all combat elements of the regular South Vietnamese ground forces are to be equipped with the M-16" by July of this year, and that by November 1968, 100,000 more M-16's "will have been provided to the Regional and Popular forces."

The two-year contracts, totaling $98 million, were awarded to Harrington and Richardson Co., of Worcester, Mass., and General Motors Corp., of Ypsilanti, Mich. The contracts call for production of 60,000 rifles by each of the two companies during the first year, and an additional 180,000 rifles each during the second year.

Production under the contracts is to begin in February and reach a rate of 25,000 rifles a month by November 1969. The dual order was the largest ever by the Army for the M-16. The largest previous production order for the M-16 was $25.8 million contract awarded to Colt in September 1967 for 242,716 rifles.

Solibakke Named Chairman Of Contract Appeals Board

Richard C. Solibakke has been appointed chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, succeeding Louis Spector, who was recently named a commissioner of the U.S. Court of Claims.

A member of the board since 1963, Mr. Solibakke was graduated from the University of Washington in 1948 and received his law degree from Harvard Law School in 1951. Prior to his recent appointment, he was a member of the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals for two years.

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals acts as the authorized representative for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments in hearing, considering and determining appeals by contractors from decisions of contracting officers on disputes involving DOD contracts.

President Pledges Continued Support To South Korea

President Johnson has reassured South Korean President Chung Hee Park that the United States stands ready to join with South Korea to meet any armed aggression against that nation.

Terming increased communist pressures along the Korean Demilitarized Zone "a serious threat to the security of the Republic of Korea and to peace in East Asia," President Johnson and President Park agreed that efforts to strengthen U.S. and South Korean forces in Korea must continue in order "to deal effectively and swiftly with all contingencies in Korea."

Mr. Johnson met with the South Korean chief executive during a two-day conference in Hawaii April 17-18 to discuss both the continuing communist aggression in Korea and current U.S. efforts to meet with representatives of the North Vietnam government.

In the event North Korea communists continue their "aggressive actions," the U.S. and South Korea will immediately determine what actions should be taken to meet the threat under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, according to a joint communique issued April 17.

President Johnson also assured President Park that the U.S. will continue to consult with the Republic of Korea and other allies on the U.S. position should negotiations develop between the United States and North Vietnam.

It was agreed that any settlement of the conflict in Vietnam must "respect the wishes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people," and that the South Vietnamese government should take a full part in any negotiations to end the war. In addition, the communique stated, allied nations which have helped defend South Vietnam "should participate in any settlement of the conflict."

President Park expressed satisfaction with the U.S. decision to reduce the area of bombing in North Vietnam, while agreeing with President Johnson that an honorable and secure peace in Vietnam requires the pursuit of a diplomatic solution coupled with military firmness.

The policy of both nations in this regard, President Johnson and President Park said, is to sustain the efforts "to meet the requirements of the struggle in all respects until peace is attained."



MEDAL TO MPs—Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, deputy U.S. commander in Vietnam, pins a Silver Star on one of 15 members of the 18th Military Police Brigade decorated for heroism. Fourteen Silver Stars and one Bronze Star were presented for gallantry in action during the recent Tet attack. SP4 Charles Miller receives his medal while SP4 Alvin Troyer awaits his turn. Both are assigned to the 716th Military Police Battalion in Saigon.

'Distinguished Naval Graduate' Program Begun For Reserve Officer Candidates

The Department of the Navy has instituted a program to increase retention of naval officers who have obvious career potential, seeking to provide them with early motivation for a Navy career.

Selected graduates of Navy reserve officer training programs at officer candidate schools in Newport, R.I., Pensacola, Fla., and at each NROTC unit in the nation, will receive a "Distinguished Naval Graduate" designation and a regular Navy commission.

In approving the new program, Navy Secretary Paul R. Ignatius said, "We intend to seek out and recognize reserve officer candidates who are qualified for and desire a Navy career."

Candidates for the designation must rank in the top 20 percent of the class and volunteer to accept a regular Navy commission. Candidates in the top one-third of the class may also be considered if they are ranked in the top 10 percent in military aptitude.

Demonstrated motivation for regular appointment and demonstrated leadership qualities are the primary criteria for selection. Additionally, moral character, physical qualifications, and rank in college class when applicable will be considered. Flight aptitude will be a factor for candidates in flight programs.

Local boards at officers candidates schools and NROTC units will make initial nominations to the Chief of Naval Personnel.

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